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Abstract. In Turkey, the development of a labour movement under relatively independent 
circumstances was not allowed historically, and supervision via legislation has regulated the 
union rights within narrow patterns. For this reason, in order to assess the development of 
the labour movement in Turkey, the essential characteristics of the political culture must be 
taken into consideration in addition to the objective conditions of the economy and the efforts 
to be articulated to international capitalism. Yet, the regulations in force are far behind 
the international norms which, in fact, do not threaten global capitalism. Constitutional 
regulations neglect the political function of trade unions and restrict the right to establish 
trade unions by a series of abstract security concerns. Public officials are excluded from 
the right to strike and the strikes are limited by the conflict of interests. Furthermore, the 
Government authority on strike postponement is reduced to a ban on strikes by means of 
mandatory arbitration regulations which are under Constitutional guarantee.
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Introduction
Turkey encounters a series of criticisms regarding the standards of union rights in 
the international area. It was included in the agenda of the ILO Application Committee, 
ever and anon in the special paragraph, and omissions pertaining to the union rights have 
been emphasized in many of the Progress Reports issued by the EU. Hence, The Progress 
Report of 2011 indicates that the current legal framework is also not conformable with 
the EU norms and ILO Conventions. The legal progress achieved was considered limited 
and attention was called to the disproportionate force applied by law enforcement bodies 
in order to preclude the actions related to the union rights. 
However, almost all of the legal regulations done in Turkey are based on the aim 
of conformity with the EU and ILO norms. As the regulations on union rights of the 
Constitutional amendment of 2012, the justification of the draft law on labour relations 
has also been prepared with the same approach. Within this framework, the regulations 
required in the field of union rights are indicated as one of the prerequisite criteria for the 
negotiations of “social policy and employment” chapter and the aim of harmonization of 
incompatible norms are stressed. 
As for harmonization discussions, different interpretations and approaches come 
into prominence. For instance, the Government precludes a series of remedial regulation 
related to the right to strike for the reason that these are not binding harmonization 
criteria while a significant part of the worker unions bases their claims on ILO norms 
and the EU Acquis Communitaire. Therefore, the interpretation issue is important to put 
forward to what extent the union rights are binding in the presence of the EU and ILO 
as well as the harmonization responsibilities of the candidate countries. The discussions 
related to this topic are usually resolved and clarified through the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) decrees.
Discussing the union rights within the working dynamics of capitalism rather than 
the context of the international standards, suggests a different approach in terms of the 
resource of the claims. Such an approach is very important with respect to address the 
class results of the EU Candidateship. It is based on the class analysis of the social policy 
and comes up for discussion to what extend the international norms can contradict with 
the cyclical needs of global capitalism. According to this, a system characterized by 
capital domination inevitably renders the corrosion of democratic rights for the non-
capital social stratums. 
Within this framework, Müftüoğlu brings into question the unionisation ever 
weakening in the EU countries. Through the report of the International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)1 on the labour standards in the EU (2004), he indicates 
that in some EU Member States the right to organize and strike is precluded while in 
some other there are severe problems in exercising such right.2 Similar determinations 
are reflected in the report of 2009 as well. Notwithstanding, the ILO Fundamental 
Conventions regarding the union rights have been ratified by the entire EU Member 
1 ICFTU, annulled itself with the establishment of ITUC in 2006.
2 Müftüoğlu, Ö. AB’ye Üyelik Sürecinin İktisadi ve Toplumsal Boyutları. Türkiye Sosyalist İktisat Kongresi. 
İstanbul, 2005. 
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States, inadequacies regarding the prevention of anti-union discrimination and the right 
to strike are expressed, particularly in the new Member States. Nevertheless, in some old 
Member States as Belgium, France, Greece and UK increase in the attempts to limit the 
right to strike is remarked. As for the proportionality assessment of ECJ in cross-border 
situations within the EU is indicated to weaken the principle of legality of the collective 
actions and is against to the freedom of association.3 
Akkaya suggests that the integration process narrows the social policy field actually 
within the EU, particularly with respect to social security and laws on labour relations. 
He indicates that even the Governments established by the social democratic parties 
sometimes corrode the social rights in order to accelerate the capital accumulation. 
From his viewpoint, membership would not bring the advanced regulations for Turkey, 
expected in the field of social rights and social policy. Furthermore, he points out that 
the ILO norms are at the EU standards and argues for the inessentiality of the EU 
Membership in terms of putting the regulations at this standard into practice.4 
On the contrary, Çelik suggests that Turkey is far behind the EU standards in the 
field of social policy and the union rights, and indicates that the harmonization process 
contains significant opportunities as regards to the social rights. Emphasizing that the 
EU process is not a magic wand, he points out the difference between Anglo-American 
capitalism and European capitalism and argues that such a difference cannot be neglected 
in terms of the working rules of capitalist laws.5
As for this study, social policy has a limited potential for class acquisition due to 
being a field pertinent to capitalism. Therefore, the international institutes, organizations 
and norms are not considered as assurance for working class. However, the essential aim 
of the study is to research to what extent the constitutional regulations on union rights 
conform to the requirements of those international standards. This is because; both the 
ruling party and the opposition in the Parliament have focused on this issue as well as 
the public opposition who has made claims upon particularly within this context.
From this view point, following the first chapter putting forward the outlines of the 
historical development of the Turkish union legislation and the impact of the political 
culture on this process, the question of harmonization with the international standards is 
reviewed in regard to constitutional regulations.
1. Development of Labour Union Legislation: Historical 
Background 
Labour unions in Turkey have not developed as a result of labour movement, as in 
the West, but turned into an institution within the framework considered necessary by the 
political authority. Initialized by the approval of the political power, labour unions were 
3 ITUC(2009): Internationally Recognised Core Labour Standarts In The European Union [interactive]. 
[accessed on 02-17-2011]. <http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/FINAL_EU_CLS_2009_report_1_.pdf>.
4 Akkaya, Y. Yetiş Ya Avrupa Birliği, 2004 [interactive]. [accessed on 02-17-2011]. <http://www.sendika.
org/yazi.php?yazi_no=895>. 
5 Çelik, A. AB Emeğe Zararlı mı? Birikim, 2004, p. 187. 
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developed and limited by state. From this point of view, labour unions that criticized for 
evolving into bureaucratic organizations in the West have already been emerged in this 
form in Turkey.6 
The limited number of legal regulations of the Ottoman Period which are 
authoritarian in nature have been extended to the Republic Period and continued to 
determine the labour relations.7 With the introduction of Ottoman Strike Act (Tatil-i 
Eşgal Kanunu, 1909) unionization in public services was banned and severe restrictions 
were brought to strike. Where, The Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun 
Kanunu, 1925) abrogated the right of association and interdicted any sort of professional 
or political organization. 
In 1936, The Labour Act No. 3008 addressed the labour relations integrally for the 
very first time and both individual and collective labour relations were regulated together 
with assigning a determinative weight to the State with respect to collective labour 
relations. This law institutionalized representation of the workers without mentioning 
the labour unions, banned both strike and lockout and regulated mandatory arbitration 
system for the resolution of disputes in collective labour relations.8 
Introduction of the Law of Association (Cemiyetler Kanunu, 1938) has prohibited 
the establishment of association on class base and this prohibition has lasted until the 
adoption of the new Law on Associations (1946). With the removal of the ban many 
unions were established and became operational.9 After all, the first Trade Unions Law 
of the Republican Period was adopted in 1947, but the ban to strike continued until the 
1960’s. 
Late industrialization and the limited share of the wage earners are considered 
the principals of the insufficient development of unionization. Nevertheless, the 
modernization process of Turkey, the nature of the dominant political culture and the 
characteristics of the social structure are also the factors not to be neglected for either 
the development process or the current situation of union movement. 
The political process has been designed by the single- party government and its 
populism ideology until 1946. Holding on the basis of a sociological perspective against 
conflict, the populism ideology has considered the society as an organic whole made up 
various profession groups and has rejected the presence of the social classes and class 
diversity of interests.10 The institutional structure of the regime has been protected even 
transforming into a multi-party system in 1946. The constitutional regulations about 
the fundamental rights and freedoms deprived the social opposition of supervising 
the government. A judicial review as well was not regulated for government actions. 
Within this context, the Government changed with the first general elections in a multi-
6 Koray, M. Değişen Koşullarda Sendikacılık. TÜSES, İstanbul, 1994.
7 Makal, A. Cumhuriyet’ten 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye’de Çalışma İlişkileri. Cahit Talas Anısına Güncel Sosyal 
Politika Tartışmaları. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, Yayın No: 595, Ankara, 2007.
8 Ibid., p. 517. 
9 Özkiraz, A.; Nuray, T. Sendikaların Doğuşu; Türkiye ve Batı Avrupa Ülkeleri Karşılaştırması. Sosyal 
Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi. 2008, 2: 120. 
10 Makal, A., supra note 7, p. 516, 517.
Societal Studies. 2012, 4(3): 901–921. 905
party environment in 1950. However, a majority approach has dominated instead of 
a democratic settlement.11 As of the 1960’s, Turkish political life has periodically 
encountered military interventions.
According to Öztürk, the insufficient development of Turkish labour unions 
is a result of the ideological approach of the State towards the organized society as 
well as the traditional cultural codes particularly including the prohibitive solidarity 
practices. Stating that the political culture inheres “solidarist, paternalist, populist, 
elitist, congregational and patrimonial elements simultaneously,” she points out the 
anti-conflict perspective raised and mentions that this is why unionization could not be 
able to work within its own dynamics.12 
As for Urhan and Çelik, the “national security” perception of the regime has critical 
impact for addressing the historical circumstances in which the union movement has 
emerged and developed in Turkey. They indicate that such perception has an autonomous 
effect on the labour union movement.13 
Hence, during the legislature discussions of the Trade Unions Law adopted in 1947, 
the importance of the state regulation was defended with respect to prevent the risk of 
the labour unions heading towards “dangerous” trends via politization, in line with the 
ideological ambience of the period. It was clearly mentioned that these newly emerging 
associations should be structured through the notion of nationalism and statism.14 
From this point of view, Akkaya and Güngör emphasize that during the period 
of 1947-50 the State attempted to prevent the potential oppositions via integrating the 
labour unions with the system. According to this, the working class and their unions 
became the main actors that the State benefits from, in terms of nationalism principle of 
the official ideology. Yet, in addition to forming the group to be nationalized, the unions 
are significant in terms of socialization of this ideology as an organized group.15 
After transition to a multi-party system, the 1960’s is the period in which the national 
characteristic of global capitalism reveals itself. The target of expanding the domestic 
market led to proliferation of welfare policies all around the world, and collective 
bargaining became widespread in the field of labour relations. In the same period, 
Turkish economy entered into the planned stage of capitalist accumulation through the 
adjustment process provided by a military coup. After the military coup of 1960, the 
Constitution prepared in 1961 regulated the right to establish trade unions together with 
collective bargaining and the right to strike. Following that, Trade Unions Law No. 274 
and Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout No. 275 were adopted in 1963.
Since the Constitution did not limit the union right with the workers, it was possible 
also for public servants to exercise this right. In 1965, the Law on Trade Unions for 
11 Karadağ, A.; Zafer, A. Kurumsal Güvencelerin İşlevsizlik Kavşağındaki Demokrasi: Türkiye, Mustafa 
Kemal Üniversitesi. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi. 2009, 6(11): 164, 165.
12 Öztürk, A. Siyasi Kültür Bağlamında Türkiye’de Devlet- Sivil Toplum İlişkisi: Sendikacılık Örneği. Bilgi. 
2007, 1(14). 
13 Urhan, B.; Seydi, Ç. Türkiye’de Sistemin “Milli Güvenlik” Algısı ve Bunun İşçi Hareketleri ve Sendikacılık 
Faaliyeti Üzerindeki Etkisi. Çalışma ve Toplum. 2010, 2(25): 111.
14 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 8. Dönem, C: 4, 47. Birleşim, 1947, p. 297, p. 301. 
15 Akkaya, Y.; Fatih, G. Düzen ve Kalkınma Arayışları İçinde Türkiye’de Sendikacılık ve Milliyetçilik. Tarih 
ve Milliyetçilik, 1. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi Bildiriler, Mersin Üniversitesi (30 Nisan- 2 Mayıs), 1997.
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Public Officials No. 624 was adopted. However, with the constitutional amendment 
following the military memorandum in 1971, the right unionize was limited with solely 
the workers.16 Also during period in which the Constitution enables the association of 
the public officials, the right to strike and collective bargaining were limited with only 
the workers. Moreover in this period, the strike prohibitions were regulated in Law No. 
275 and “strike postponement” has been included in the labour legislation (art. 21). 
“National security” has been regulated as one of the grounds for strike postponement. 
However, this concept has not been recognized at the legal or constitutional level. 
Regulating such an abstract notion as a base for the limitation of a right has often been 
criticized in the doctrine and attention was drawn to the fact that it should be narrowly 
interpreted.17 The scope and borders of the “national security” notion were rather 
determined by the adjudications and in its decree no 1974/ 13 the Constitutional Court 
has considered that the notions “national security” and “public order” are the general 
terms that are convenient to subjective interpretation, can be expanded according to the 
individual perception and can lead to various practices, even arbitrariness.18 
In another provision of Law No. 27, the workers in the workplaces operated by the 
Ministry of National Defence, Interior Ministry and Gendarmerie General Command, 
in exercising their right to strike were tied up to the condition of determination by the 
High Board of Arbitration (YHK) of the fact that the working and wage conditions are 
against the workers (art. 20/ 11). In the continuation of this regulation, in case the same 
conditions are determined to be against the employer by YHK both situations are going 
to be realized upon the request of the parties and may result even in a lockout decree. 
With this provision, a lockout in the military workplaces has lost its character to be a 
reaction right against strike and was disciplined independent from the strike status. 
The 1980’s reflect the integration stage of Turkish economy with international 
capitalism. Again, in the transition period, a military coup is observed. After the military 
coup on 12th September 1980, with the memorandum of the National Security Council 
(MGK) the ongoing strikes were terminated and strike was prohibited.19 The activities of 
many confederations and their affiliated unions were ceased, their assets were confiscated 
and the directors of certain confederations were arrested. Among the confederations the 
activities of which were ceased, Hak-Is Trade Unions Confederation (Hak-İs) inclined 
to Islam after 6 months and Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions (MİSK) came 
into activity again after 4 years. However, the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade 
Unions (DİSK) was shut-down and was put on trial in the military court until 1991. In 
1991, the Military Court of Cassation revoked the decision on the shut-down of DİSK, 
the directors were acquitted, but the assets of DİSK and affiliated unions were not 
returned. In the same year, DİSK had a meeting of the general assembly and restarted its 
activities. The return of assets was realized in 1992.20 
16 Makal, A., supra note 7, p. 526. 
17 Kutal, M. Bakanlar Kurulu Tarafından Ertelenen Grevler. İktisat ve Maliye Dergisi. 1997, 13(12): 506 & 
Çelik, N. İş Hukuku Dersleri. Beta Yayınevi. İstanbul, 1998, p. 556. 
18 Çelik, A. Milli Güvenlik Gerekçeli Grev Ertelemeleri. Çalışma ve Toplum. İstanbul, 2008, 3(18): 91.
19 Özveri, M. Sendikal Hak ve Özgürlüklerde 2010 Anayasa Değişikliği. İş’te Çalışanlar. 2010, 4: 28.
20 Çetik, M.; Akkaya, Y. Türkiye’de Endüstri İlişkileri. Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı. İstanbul, 
1999, p. 124. 
Societal Studies. 2012, 4(3): 901–921. 907
After the enforcement of the new Constitution in 1982, Trade Unions Law No. 
2821 and the Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout No. 2822 were adopted 
in 1983. Through these new regulations, on the ground of “establishing strong labour 
unions,” the freedom of establishing trade unions was limited within the sector level, 
the federations were prohibited and it was adjudicated that the workers could not 
members of more than one union at the same time. Trade unions, in order to obtain the 
authority for collective bargaining, were conditioned to double threshold trial (double 
criteria) in levels of representation.21 Furthermore, the strike bans were increased, 
strike postponement was converted into a constitutional provision and constitutional 
regulations are still in force, which envisage the resolution of disputes to last after the 
postponement period to be solved by the mandatory arbitration were introduced.
International labour law admits the requirement of positive action of the State in 
order to exercise the union rights. In the contrary, the state policies in Turkey have chosen 
the way of prohibition and restriction historically. The repressive mindset that emerged 
before the Republic continued in the Republican period and except for some certain 
regulations from 1960 reached today without losing their influence.22 The constitution of 
1982 is still in force and has many amendments until today. However, many regulations 
limiting the union rights are still valid. These regulations are elaborated in details in the 
further chapters of the study. 
2. International Legal Basis for the Indivisibility of Union Rights 
The main goal of the unionization is to prevent the employer to determine the 
working conditions unilaterally using his power coming from the capital. For this reason, 
the power and claim of the unions in preserving the rights of their members essentially 
originates from the power of collective bargaining process. To which extent the parties 
may be effective in such bargaining is shaped according to the capacity of forcing the 
other side. Hence, the right to strike is the assurance of the collective agreement system 
for the workers.
 The dominant perception in the doctrine is that the coercive character of the right 
to strike should not be comprehended as a threatening element, but should be considered 
in the context of integrity of the right. The legal basis for such perception is available 
in certain international document, in the approaches put forward by international 
supervision bodies and the ECHR decisions that refer to these.
For example, in article 6 of European Social Charter (revised) the right to strike is 
regulated clearly within the scope of the right to collective bargaining. And in article 
28 of EU Fundamental Rights Charter (2000) it is stated that “...in cases of conflicts of 
interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.”
21 In order to obtain the power of making collective agreement at workplace or enterprise level for a worker’s 
union, it has to represent at least 10% of the workers in the sector it is established as well as one more than 
half of the workers employed in the workplace or enterprise level. 
22 Özveri, M., supra note 19, p. 28.
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As for ILO, the approach pertaining to right to strike is shaped essentially through 
the decisions of the supervisory bodies. According to Gülmez, they have a function 
similar to ECHR although they are not judicial bodies. Hence, provision of legal 
conformity to the Conventions requires the performance of supervision through the 
supervisory bodies.23 
ILO supervisory bodies admit the right to strike is assured within the scope of some 
certain articles in Convention No. 87 as an integral part of the right to unionize. Despite 
there is no clear provision, the supervisory bodies advocate that any general restriction 
to be introduced to the right to strike will breach the rights and opportunities envisaged 
by the concerned Convention.24 
According to ILO Committee on Freedom of Association and committee of 
Experts, strike is defined as a fundamental right in terms of employees and their unions. 
The approach that the employee categories deprived of this right should be narrowed. 
Besides, the right to strike cannot be the subject of any prejudiced punishment and such 
an approach is considered discriminating attitude towards the unions.25 
On the other hand, ECHR has systematically changed the narrow and strict positivist 
approach on the substance of the union right and adopted that there is an organic bond 
between the freedom of association right and both collective bargaining and the right 
to strike. This approach dominating its decisions about Turkey between 2006-2009, 
asserts the legal assurance of the approach on indivisibility of union rights. Besides, 
its references to the supervisory bodies as a method of interpretation in its decisions on 
the union rights, is regarded as providing the views of the supervisory bodies with the 
characteristic of “adjudication.”26 
Nevertheless, the “binding aspect” of the union rights at EU level is still under 
debate either in academic or political environments and article 137 of Amsterdam 
Treaty is at the focus of these debates. According to the paragraph 6 of the concerned 
article, right to organize and right to strike are excluded from the scope of the area about 
which the Community can take decisions. For this reason, Gülmez approach stating that 
“the union rights are the stepchild of the harmonization process” is still under debate 
actually in terms of the integration process in addition to his emphasis with respect to 
Turkey’s harmonization process.27
On the contrary, Çelik proposes that the provision in article 137 should be 
considered as exception and interpreted narrowly. According to him, the union rights 
23 Gülmez, M. Sendikal Haklara İlişkin Sözleşmelerin İç Hukuka Üstünlüğü ve Yasalarımızdaki Aykırılıklar. 
Çalışma ve Toplum. İstanbul, 2005, 1(4): 44.
24 Erdayı, U. Türk Mevzuatının Sendika Özgürlüğüne İlişkin 87 Sayılı Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü 
Sözleşmesi’ne Uyum Sorunu. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi. 2009, 13(3): 
220, 221. 
25 Gernigon, B.; Odero, A.; Guido, H. ILO Principles Concerning the Right to Strike [interactive]. 2000 
[accessed on 10-29-2010]. <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/
publication/wcms_087987.pdf>. 
26 Gülmez, M. Sendikal Hakların Bölünmezliği: Toplu Sözleşmesiz ve Grevsiz Sendika Hakkı, Özünden 
Yoksundur. Çalışma ve Toplum. İstanbul, 2010, 3(26): 9, 40, 41.
27 Gülmez, M. Uyum Düzenlemelerinin Üvey Evladı: Sendikal Haklar. Anayasa ve Uyum Yasaları. Ankara: 
Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayını, 2002.
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are assured at the contractual level as political criterion. Thus, it stands for more superior 
assurance than the directives foreseen by the concerned article. The EU, in not having 
the power to prepare a directive on union rights, does not liberate the Member States and 
candidate countries from the responsibility of assuring these rights either by legislation 
or in practice.28 
Moreover, according to the Court of the Justice, the Community Law protects 
fundamental rights. Thus, the ILO Conventions no 87, 98 and 151 are included 
in the Community acquisition. Besides, regarding the ILO norms and the reports of 
the supervisory bodies for the preparation of the Progress Reports, The European 
Commission has a tacit adoption of this approach.29 
3. Legal Basis for Union Rights in Turkey 
1982 Constitution which has been the final shape by the National Security Council 
after the military coup in 1980 is still in force. The Constitution was amended for many 
times until today and ultimately with the Law no 5982 in 2010. The scope of the Law no 
5982 comprises regulations related to the union rights as well and the aforementioned 
amendments have entered into force after the referendum. In this part of the study the 
provisions used to exist before the amendment are examined, followed by the evaluation 
of the scope of the Law no 5982 and successive changes. 
3.1. Constitutional Provisions Regulating Union Rights 
There are provisions in the Constitution about the right to establish trade unions (art. 
51), the right to collective agreement (art. 53) and the right to strike (art.54). In particular, 
detailed regulations took place about the right to strike and the exercising of it has been 
limited either by direct prohibitions or by a series of restricting provisions. According 
to Özveri, the regulations in article 54 are the most evident ones that demonstrate the 
pro- coup mindset is to collective rights. He mentions that this article is written “in 
an approach to limit and preclude the practice of these rights” rather than assuring 
the right to strike. Therewithal, another characteristic of article 54 is the fact that it 
has not been changed until the recent amendment of the Constitution and conserved its 
provisions since the coup period until today.30
The regulations brought in 1982 (art. 54) limited the implementation of strikes 
with only the conflicts that arise during the bargaining process and did not allow to 
strikes for conflicts resulted from the implementation of collective agreement. The 
collective actions as strike with political grounds, solidarity strike, general strike and 
occupation of workplace together with slowdown of work and performance reduction 
were directly prohibited. Furthermore, the situations of prohibition and postponement 
28 Çelik, A. Avrupa Birliği Sosyal Politikası: Gelişimi, Kapsamı ve Türkiye’nin Uyum Süreci-1, 2004 
[interactive]. [accessed on 19-10-2011]. <http://www.kristalis.org.tr/aa_dokuman/absosyalpolitikasi1.pdf>. 
29 Gülmez, M., supra note 23, p. 46.
30 Özveri, M., supra note 19, p. 29.
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of the strike were adjudicated to be disciplined by Law. Detailed regulations have been 
done in the postponement and it was adjudicated that disputes remained at the end of the 
postponement should be resolved by the High Board of Arbitration (YHK). The relevant 
article arranges that the decisions of YHK have the force of collective agreement and 
definitive judgement. 
Article 54 rendered the workers and the union liable for the material damage 
occurred in the workplace during the strike due to the misconduct and intentional 
behaviour. Another provision is that the right to strike cannot be exercised in contrary to 
bona fides, in the public nuisance and in the manner to destroying the national wealth. 
Kutal draws the attention to the difficulty in determining the borders of the notions 
as “breach”, “nuisance” and “destroy” in a collective bargaining process based on 
mutual conflicts and emphasizes severe concerns about the right to strike.31
As for public officials, the political environment in which the Constitution was 
prepared did not tolerate unionization, nor had a provision to directly prohibit this. From 
this point of view, it was defended that there is no constitutional obstacle against the 
unionization of the public officials, particularly in the scientific ambience. After the 
ratification of ILO Conventions No. 87 and 151, in 1993 many public official unions 
were established.32 In 1995, the right to establish trade unions and superior organizations 
for public officials was regulated in Constitution (art. 53). However, these unions were 
out of the scope of the collective agreement and right to strike. It was governed as these 
organizations could make collective negotiation with the management but regardless 
of reaching an agreement or not the consequence should be left to the discretion of the 
Council of Ministers. Kutal states that “it is even not possible to understand properly 
whether the right to organize has been granted to the public officials or not.”33
Apart from the provisions about public officials, the regulations on the right to 
establish trade unions (art. 51) are also under debate. According to the relevant article, 
establishing unions, becoming member and dropping out does not require permission. 
However, the right to establish trade unions is limited with the scope of protection and 
improvement of the economic and social rights only within the labour relations. 
In this regard, neglecting the characteristic of trade unions as a pressure group 
and their political function, the Constitution adopts a unionization approach based 
on the “wage conscious”. Such an approach is the reflection of the concerns against 
the collective rights and freedoms and aims to minimize the political activities of the 
working mass.34 
Besides, the relevant article mentions that the right to establish trade union can be 
limited by law on the grounds of preserving national security, public order, prevention 
of crime, social health and morality, as well as the rights and freedoms of the others. 
31 Kutal, M. Uluslararası Çalışma Normları Karşısında 1982 T.C. Anayasası’nın Grev Hakkına İlişkin 
Hükümleri. Osman Güven Çankaya’ya Armağan. Ankara: Kamu İşverenleri Sendikası, 2010, p. 327. 
32 Kutal, M. Uluslararası Çalışma Normları Karşısında Kamu Görevlilerinin Sendikal Örgütlenme Haklarına 
İlişkin Bazı Gözlemler. Kamu- İş Dergisi. 2002, 6(4). 
33 Kutal, M., supra note 32. 
34 Işıklı, A. İş Hukuku, İmaj Yayıncılık. Ankara, 1996 & Tanör, B. İki Anayasa, Beta Yayınevi. İstanbul, 1994. 
Cited in Aydın, M. Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlarında Sendika Özgürlüğü. TÜHİS. 2006, 20(1-2). 
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“The legislations, management and functioning of the trade unions and the superior 
organizations cannot be contradictory to the fundamental characteristics of the Republic 
and the basis of democracy” is stated. Moreover, in this article the provision often 
criticised by ILO “one cannot be member of more than one trade union at the same time 
and in the same industry simultaneously” is also regulated.
3.2.  Scope of Law No 5982 
The sole change introduced regarding the right to establish trade unions was the 
removal of the provision “one cannot be member of more than one trade union at the 
same time in the same industry simultaneously” from the Constitution (art. 51/4). 
On the other hand, the most important amendment is the addition of the provision 
“the officials and the public servant have the right to make collective agreement” 
(art. 53). According to this, the conciliation or dispute situation reached at the end 
of the negotiations is excluded from discretion of the Council of Ministers. In case 
of conciliation, collective agreement is going to be signed and implemented. On the 
contrary, in case of disputes the parties could apply to the “Arbitration Council of Public 
Officials” The decisions of the Council have the force of collective agreement and 
definitive judgement. Another regulation executed in the field of collective agreement 
is the removal of the provision “more than one collective labour agreement cannot be 
signed and implemented in the same workplace for the same period” (art. 53) from the 
Constitution.
As for the right to strike, two provisions have been removed from the Constitution 
(art. 54). The first one is that which renders the union liable for material damage that 
occurred in the workplace due to the intention and misconduct of the workers participating 
in the strike (art. 54/3). And the other is the one that prohibits the collective actions as 
strike with political grounds, solidarity strike, general strike, occupation of workplace, 
slowdown of work and performance reduction (art. 54/7). 
4. Compliance of Constitutional Regulations with the  
International Standards 
4.1.  Constitutional Regulations on Freedom of Association
Turkey has been discussed in the agenda of the ILO Application Committee mostly 
in terms of the Convention No. 98. Similarly, in the Reports of the Experts’ Committee 
the most criticisms were in context of the Conventions No. 87 and 98, too. Furthermore, 
the criticisms of the Experts’ Committee on the union rights of the public officials are 
also based on the same conventions.35 Considering the constitutional regulations with 
35 Dereli, T. Uluslar arası Çalışma Normları, Sendika Özgürlükleri ve Türkiye: ILO Eleştirileri Açısından Yeni 
Yasa Taslağının Değerlendirilmesi. AB-Türkiye & Endüstri İlişkileri. Hekimler, A.; Yayınevi, B. (eds.). 
İstanbul, 2004, p. 168. 
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respect to these, the amendments done appear to be insufficient. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that some certain expectations of ILO about the freedom of association are 
debatable in the doctrine. 
For instance, the amendment that enables the workers to be members of more than 
one trade union simultaneously was welcomed by ILO. However, it receives various 
criticisms in the doctrine. In this context severe challenges about potency would be 
encountered together with the question of “which way to follow” in case of contradiction 
among the collective agreements under the condition of multi representation. On the 
other hand, all these complicated processes have some risks of eradicating association 
and fortifying the yellow unions. However, this amendment can be turned into an 
advantage for the workers who are working in more than one workplace belong to 
different industries within a flexible employment relation.36 
At this juncture, the limitation on grass roots—not mentioned in any constitutional 
regulation—is also criticized by ILO in the same vein. However, there are different 
opinions about this subject in the doctrine. For instance, Erdayı argues that it is necessary 
to consider the subjective conditions of one country as much as the notional advantages 
related to the type of unionization and asserts that industrial unions is an appropriate 
regulation in terms of the historical and social circumstances of Turkey.37 On the 
contrary Çetik and Akkaya remind us that nearly all of the industrial unions today have 
been formed as a result of the structural transformation of the trade unions established at 
workplace level in the past.38 Hence, prohibition of workplace unionism has preventive 
effect actually on the development of industrial unionism.39 
Going back to the Constitutional amendment, the unionism approach to neglect 
the political function of the trade unions still continues. The provisions limiting the 
right to establish trade union by notions as “national security” and “public order” were 
retained in the Constitution (art. 51). However, Aydın upholds that such limitations are 
conformable to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECONHR)40 where the 
provision “the legislations, management and functioning of the trade unions and the 
superior organizations cannot be contradictory to the fundamental characteristics of 
the Republic and the basis of democracy” is not.41
36 Güzel, K. E. Anayasa Değişikliği ve Sendikal Haklar, 2010 [interactive]. [accessed on 10-12-2010]. <http://
www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=31895>.
37 Erdayı, U., supra note 24. 
38 Çetik, M.; Akkaya, Y., supra note 20. 
39 Işıklı, A. 1960-1986 Döneminde Türkiye’de İşçi Hakları. Türkiye’de İşçi Hakları (Osmanlı Döneminden 
1986’ya). Ankara: Türkiye Yol- İş Sendikası, 1986 & Işıklı, A. cited in Çetik, M.; Akkaya, Y., supra note 
20, p. 122.
40 In order to avoid confusion with The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), The European Convention 
on Human Rights is abbreviated as ECONHR within this text. 
41 Aydın, M., supra note 34. 
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4.2. Constitutional Regulations About Public Officers and ECHR  
 Decisions
The right to collective agreement granted to public officers is incomplete, since it 
does not cover the right to strike and has a characteristic far from meeting the international 
judicial decisions. Yet, Turkey has been condemned many times by the ECHR for the 
limitations on the union rights of public officials and the ban of strike. Moreover, the 
decisions of the Court on the public officers participating in the strike initialized new 
debates in the doctrine.
Satılmış and Others v. Turkey case (No. 74611/01, 26876/02, 27628/02; Judgement 
of 17-07-2007) is related to the public officers employed in the toll collection units of 
the Bosporus Bridge. They left the toll booths and stopped working in order to protest 
the working conditions in direction of the decision of their union and were condemned. 
However, ECHR judged that the sanctions applied to the applicants were not required in 
a democratic society and article 11 of ECONHR has been violated.
According to Candoğan, this decision should be interpreted as “the assurance of 
the right to strike of public officers.”42 But Balcı, on the other hand, points out that the 
Court has used the expression of “collective action” instead of “strike” in its decision 
and whether each kind of work stoppage can be considered as strike or not is debateable. 
According to her, the permanent case law of ECHR protects the right to unionize but not 
collective agreement and strike within the scope of article 11 of ECONHR.43 Similarly, 
considering Gustafsson/Sweden (App. No. 15573/89) decision, Sur also criticises ECHR 
for not addressing the union rights in context of indivisibility principle.44
As for Urcan v. Turkey case (No. 23018/04, 23034/04, 23042/04, 23071/04, 
23073/04, 23081/04, 23086/04, 23091/04, 23094/04, 23444/04, 23676/04; Judgement 
of 17. 07. 2008), ECHR considered the punishment received by public officers—for 
stopping work for 1 day through the decision of their union—as intervention to the right 
of freedom of the union. Concluding that the sanctions applied to the applicants were 
not required in a democratic society, ECHR judged that article 11 of ECONHR has been 
violated. Even so, certain jurists have criticised also this decision with respect to the 
complete assurance of right to strike.
For instance, according to Gülmez, this decision shows that ECHR has considered 
the right to strike within the context of union rights assured in article 11 of ECONHR. 
But he still criticises the decision for not making references to European Social Charter 
(revised) and Convention no 87 to secure the right to strike substantially.45
The decision of ECHR in Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen/Turkey case (No. 68959/01; 
Judgement of 21-04-2009), after all, concludes discussions on the assurance of right to 
42 Candoğan, G. Memura Grev Hakkına AİHM Güvencesi. Radikal İki. 9 Aralık, 2007.
43 Balcı, Ş. G. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesinin “Satılmış ve Diğerleri/ Türkiye” Kararı. Çalışm.a ve 
Toplum. İstanbul, 2008, 2(217). 
44 Sur, M. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Divanı’nın Gustafsson/İsveç Kararı. Kenan Tunçomağ’a Armağan. İstanbul: 
İÜHF, 1997. 
45 Gülmez, M., supra note 26, p. 37.
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strike within the scope of ECONHR (art. 11). In this decision, to judge that article 11 
of ECONHR has been violated, the Court has clearly mentioned the right to strike and 
its importance for unions through references to both ILO supervisory bodies and Social 
Charter (revised). On the other hand, in this decision ECHR states that some restrictions 
can be introduced to the right to strike depending on certain conditions. However, a full 
prohibition to apply to the public officers in general is beside the mark. In the context of 
the limitations brought to the right to strike, it is stated that the public officer categories 
subject to the limitation should be defined as clear and limitative as possible.
The defence of the Turkish Government in ECHR is based on the reservations 
made to European Social Charter (revised) (art. 5, art. 6) and the opinion that the ILO 
Conventions No. 87 and 151 do not force the states to recognize the right to strike, is 
defended. Departing from the fact that the decisions taken by the supervisory bodies of 
ILO are not binding, the thesis that one state cannot be liable for the articles which are 
not ratified is put forward. Moreover, the Turkish Government stresses the situation 
of the public officers in the national legislation and claims that they are subject to a 
separate and quite detailed regulation.
On the contrary, Gülmez argues that the reservations made to European Social 
Charter (revised) would not exempt Turkish Government from assuring the rights 
regulated in these articles. Stating that the same articles appear in the first chapter of 
the Charter as the principles on which the party countries have agreed, he mentions that 
the states that have ratified the Convention are liable for the annulment of the union 
restrictions in their national legislation.46 
Hence, the contemporary approach of the ECHR within the context of “advanced 
normative interaction” is an integrated one regardless of the ratification of the 
international law conventions. The Court employed such an approach to the Demir and 
Baykara/Turkey case (No. 34503/97; Judgement of 12. 11. 2008) about the right to 
collective agreement for the public officers and used this in its other decisions, making 
reference to this one.47 
Apart from the requirements of judicial compliance, regulations about public 
officers are also quite distant from meeting the social expectations. The first article of 
the Final Declaration of the “Workshop on Union and Democratic Rights of the Public 
Officers” organized by the State Personnel Administration in 2010 states “Since the 
right to collective bargaining and to strike of the public officers exist in the international 
conventions on human rights ratified by Turkey, regulations to enable the exercise of these 
rights should be done in the Constitution.” In the second article, “in order to provide the 
union rights of the public officers with a meaningful integrity” these regulations to be 
put into practice was considered as “requirement of social state” and in the last article 
it was declared that the reservations done to European Social Charter (articles 5 and 6) 
46 Gülmez, M. Anayasanın 90. Maddesi, TİS ve Grev Hakkı. KESK Konferans Kitabı. Ankara, 2006. Cited in 
Balcı, Ş. G., supra note 43, p. 220. 
47 Gülmez, M., supra note 26, p. 9.
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should be removed.48 Although this workshop had been organized under auspices of the 
state, the approach adopted in the final declaration was not reflected in constitutional 
amendment right after this meeting. 
5. Constitutional Regulations About Right to Strike 
The regulation largely agreed on in the public opinion is the annulment of the 
provision to prohibit such collective actions as strike with political grounds, solidarity 
strike, general strike, occupation of workplace, slowing down of work and performance 
reduction (art. 54/7). However, the regulations to limit the right to strike with the interest 
strikes and provisions on the postponement are still preserved. 
According to the Law on Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout No. 2822, 
the Council of Ministers has the power to postpone the strike based on the rationale of 
“general health” or “national security”. And as for the Constitutional regulation, the 
dispute to continue by the end of the postponement period would be resolved by the 
High Board of Arbitration (art. 54). Hence, the regulation that converts the government’s 
power of strike postponement into a strike prohibition through mandatory arbitration 
has still the force of Constitutional provision.
On the other hand, ILO states that the power of postponement of a strike should not 
be granted to the Government on the grounds of “national security” or “public health.” 
Instead, should be given to an independent organ to which the entire parties trust.49 
Hence, Turkey was often in the agenda of the ILO General Conferences related to the 
regulations on the postponement of the strike.50 
Besides, the concerns about the constitutional amendment reflected in the 99th 
International Labour Conference were also based on the limitations in the right to strike. 
It was emphasized that the amendment draft was adopted by the Parliament without 
providing the opinion of the social parties and concerns about the fact that the preparation 
of approximation laws could take long time.51 
The entire approximation laws on the labour relations are at the agenda of the 
Parliament. Moreover, in the draft to regulate the collective labour relations, it states 
that in case the dispute continues by the end of the postponement, a decision of strike 
could be taken again. This regulation contradicts with the constitutional provisions on 
the postponement of the strike (art. 54). However, it is considered possible to become 
law as per article 90 of the Constitution.52 
48 Devlet Personel Başkanlığı, Kamu Görevlilerinin Sendikal ve Demokratik Hakları Çalıştayı. Ankara, 2010.
49 ILO, Freedom of Association (Digest of Decisions and Principles of The Freedom of Association Committee 
of The Governing Body of the ILO). International Labour Office, Geneva, 2006, p. 117.
50 Kutal, M., supra note 31, p. 327. 
51 ILC, Conference Committe On The Application of Standarts Extracts From The Record of Proceedings, 
99th Session, Geneva, 2010 [interactive]. [accessed on 03-17-2011]. <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_145220.pdf>.
52 Article 90 of the Constitution states: “For the disputes to originate from the fact that the laws and the 
international treaties on the fundamental rights and freedoms put into force by appropriate procedures 
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Another issue to be debated in terms of the constitutional amendment is the approach 
dominating the lockout regulations. In the rationale of article 7 of the amendment 
proposal, the expression “right to strike and lockout” has been used.53 According to 
this, lockout is a “right” as well as the strike and “even it is an inevitable result” of the 
strike. Hence, the Prime minister noted lockout possibility many times against the claims 
for right to strike for public officers.
In fact the approach commonly adopted for the working life suggests that lockout 
and the right to strike cannot be considered equivalent with each other. Hence, the ILO 
Supervisory Bodies do not have a decision in which the lockout is considered as a right. 
The right to strike was governed in the United Nations International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 8/d), however lockout was not mentioned.
Gülmez argues that a similar approach is adopted by the EU, too. Stating that 
the “right to collective action” included in the Social Charter does not render lockout 
equivalent to the strike and states that the countries which do not recognize lockout as a 
“right” could not be criticised.54 
Conclusion
The labour legislation of Turkey has prohibited and limited the exercise of the union 
rights historically. In this aspect, the labour movement was not permitted to develop in 
relative independent conditions and the supervision via legislation regulated the union 
rights within narrow patterns. For this reason, in order to assess the development of 
labour movement in Turkey, the essential characteristics of the political culture must 
also be taken into consideration in addition to the objective conditions of the economy 
and the efforts to be articulated to the international capitalism. Because the regulations 
in force are far behind the international norms those not threaten the global capitalism.
Almost all of the legal regulations in Turkey, including the constitutional amendment, 
are based on the aim of conformity with the EU and ILO norms. However, there are 
still many issues of contradiction in terms of union rights, harmonization of which is 
one of the prerequisite criteria for the negotiations of “social policy and employment” 
chapter. Hence, EU’s last Progress Report on Turkey (2011) indicates that the current 
legal framework is not conformable to the EU norms and ILO conventions. 
have different provisions, the provisions of the international conventions domain.” Gülmez, M., supra note 
23, p. 38 suggests that this provision is binding for the executive bodies as it is for the legislative bodies. 
It is stated that the legislative bodies are liable for not making any law contradictory to the international 
treaties and emphasize is put in the fact that the existing contradictions should be corrected starting from the 
Constitution.
53 TBMM, 7/ 11/ 1982 Tarihli ve 2709 Sayılı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasının Bazı Maddelerinde Değişiklik 
Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Teklifi ve Anayasa Komisyonu Raporu, (2/ 656), Ankara, 2010.
54 Gülmez, M. Toplu Pazarlık ve Grev Hakları ve Türkiye. Avrupa Sosyal Şartı ve Türkiye Kolokyumu. Ankara, 
1993. Cited in Çelik, A. Avrupa Birliği Anayasası: Sosyal Haklar Açısından Kaçırılan Bir Fırsat [interactive]. 
2005 [accessed on 19-10-2011]. <http://www.kristalis.org.tr/aa_dokuman/AB%20Anayasasi%20isci%20
Haklari%20Acisindan.pdf>.
Societal Studies. 2012, 4(3): 901–921. 917
Incompatibility of norms is particularly based on the lack of indivisibility principle 
for union rights in Turkey. Within this context, union rights are not realized by a holistic 
approach where the right to strike constitutes the main contradiction issue with respect to 
both legal and implementation patterns. Turkish Government continues the reservations 
on The European Social Charter (revised), claims that the ILO Conventions no 87 and 
151 do not force the states to recognize the right to strike and ignores the decisions of 
supervisory bodies on strike. 
Therefore, the right to strike is still limited to interest disputes in Turkey and 
Government potency of strike postponement continues, despite ILO stating that the 
power of postponement of a strike should not be granted to the Government with the 
grounds of “national security” or “public health.” Moreover, the regulation forcing 
mandatory arbitration at the end of the postponement period has still the force of 
Constitutional provision after the amendment of the constitution. 
In spite of the requirements of the ECHR decisions about Turkey, constitutional 
amendment excluded the public officers from the scope of the right to strike. Thus, the 
amendment appears to be insufficient even to meet the decisions of the Court. As for the 
public officers, regulations are also quite distant from meeting the social expectations. 
On the other hand, a few harmonizing regulations also entered in force with the 
introduction of the constitutional amendment. Concordantly, the way to be member 
of more than one union in the same sector and at the same time was opened and the 
right to collective agreement for the public officers was regulated. Besides, certain 
provisions related to the strike prohibitions were removed from the legislation. Within 
this framework, the annulment of the provision to prohibit such collective actions as 
strike with political grounds, solidarity strike, general strike, occupation of workplace, 
slowdown of work and performance reduction is the one largely agreed in the public 
opinion. 
As mentioned above, the principal aim of the amendment is based on meeting the 
international standards, as specified clearly in the rationales of the amended articles via 
referencing to ILO norms. Moreover some of these regulations seem to be appreciated 
by both ILO and the EU. 
However, none of them removes the inadequate content of the amendment. 
Because each type of union rights takes strength from the existence of the other and 
solely in such a situation becomes an effective and meaningful right. For this reason, 
the unity of these rights will put forward a significant perspective in terms of the 
spirit of political democracy. Not long before the constitutional amendments, the final 
declaration of the workshop organized by the State Personnel Administration has also 
been prepared adopting this approach. Furthermore, this approach was even emphasized 
to be a requirement of the social state. On the contrary, the Constitution reflects a will to 
consider the union rights independently.
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KONSTITUCINĖ TEISĖ PROFESINIŲ SĄJUNGŲ VEIKLOJE TURKIJOJE. 
LYGINAMASIS ASPEKTAS
Nilgün Ongan
Stambulo universitetas, Turkija
Santrauka. Istoriškai susiklostė, kad Turkijos profsąjungų judėjimas niekada nesifor-
mavo laisvai, o teisinis judėjimo reguliavimas spraudė profsąjungų teises į siaurus rėmus. To-
dėl, norint įvertinti Turkijos profesinių sąjungų judėjimą be objektyvių ūkio sąlygų apžvalgos 
ir be siekio įsilieti į tarptautinę kapitalistinę aplinką, būtina atsižvelgti ir į politinę kultūrą. 
Deja, galiojantys potvarkiai labai toli atsilieka nuo tarptautinių normų, kurios, iš esmės, 
nekelia grėsmės pasauliniam kapitalizmui. 
Konstituciniai straipsniai ignoruoja profesinių sąjungų politines funkcijas ir riboja pro-
fesinių sąjungų kūrimą dėl daugelio bendrų saugumo reikalavimų. Valstybės pareigūnams 
draudžiama streikuoti, o teisė streikuoti ribojama interesų konflikto prielaida. Be to, vy-
riausybės teisė atidėti streikus yra susiaurinta iki streikų draudimo ir privalomai vykdomų 
arbitražo potvarkių, kuriuos garantuoja Konstitucija.
Lyginant su Europos standartais, ypač netobula valstybės tarnautojų kolektyvinės sutar-
ties teisė, nes į ją neįtraukiama teisė streikuoti ir matomas didelis neatitikimas tarptautiniams 
teisminiams sprendimams. Turkiją daug kartų kritikavo Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas 
(EŽTT) dėl profesinių teisių valstybės pareigūnams apribojimo ir dėl draudimo streikuoti.
Turkijos vyriausybės gynyba EŽTT remiasi Europos Socialinės Chartijos (Pataisytos 
Chartijos 5 ir 6 straipsniai) ir Tarptautinės darbo organizacijos (TDO) konvencijų Nr. 87 
ir 151 nuostatomis, kad valstybės neprivalo pripažinti teisės streikuoti. Atsižvelgiant į tai, 
kad TDO sprendimai neprivalomi, teigiama, kad valstybė nėra atsakinga už neratifikuotus 
sprendimus. Be to, Turkijos vyriausybė akcentuoja valstybės pareigūnų situaciją teisėtvarkos 
požiūriu ir tai, kad jų veikla tvarkoma atskiru ir gana detaliu aprašu.
Tačiau, oponentai teigia, kad Pataisytos Europos Socialinės Chartijos nuostatos neat-
leidžia Turkijos vyriausybės nuo teisių aptariamų šioje diskusijoje garantijos. Kadangi šios 
teisės aptariamos ir pirmame Chartijos skyriuje, dėl kurio sutarė visos šalys. Oponentai teigia, 
kad valstybės atsakingos teisiškai už profesinių sąjungų veiklos ribojimų anuliavimą savo 
valstybinėje teisėje.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: profesinės sąjungos teisės, Turkija, teisė streikuoti, politinė 
kultūra.
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